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I. INTRODUCTION

In July of 1998, in a 4-3 decision, the Arkansas Supreme Court declined
an invitation to overturn its 30-year-old precedent against aggregating (or
"stacking") uninsured motorist coverage.' In other words, the court upheld as
valid a clause in an automobile insurance policy which forbade the insured
from obtaining uninsured motorist coverage benefits from more than one
policy to compensate her after she was injured by an uninsured motorist. It
made no difference that her actual damages from the wreck exceeded the
amount of coverage which she sought. Since that decision was handed down,
David Newbern, one of the fourjustices in the majority, retired from the court
and was replaced by Lavenski Smith. The newly made up court will
undoubtedly have the opportunity to again consider stacking. It is a relentless
* B.S., Hendrix College, 1989; J.D., University of Arkansas at Little Rock, 1993;
private practice, Duncan & Rainwater, P.A., Little Rock, Arkansas, 1993-present.
** B.S., Arkansas State University, 1989; J.D., University of Arkansas at Little Rock,
Arkansas, 1996 (Associate Editor, University of Arkansas at Little Rock Law Journal, 1995);
private practice, Duncan & Rainwater, P.A., Little Rock, 1996-present.
1. See Youngman v. State Farm Mut. Auto. Ins. Co., 334 Ark. 73, 971 S.W.2d 248
(1998) (declining to overturn M.F.A. Mut. Ins. Co. v. Wallace, 245 Ark. 230, 431 S.W.2d 742
(1968)). Justice Donald Corbin dissented in Youngman and was joined by Justices Tom Glaze
and Ray Thornton.

413

UALR LAW REVIEW

414

[Vol. 21

2

issue, having repeatedly found its way to the highest courts in several states,
with eventual success for the insureds more often than not. It has made it to
the Arkansas Supreme Court six times, but, as of yet, without success for the
insureds.3 Although the court's anti-stacking precedent has stood for over 30
years, it has teetered more than once during that time. Last year's 4-3 decision
marked the second time that the anti-stacking view prevailed among Supreme
Court justices by only one vote.4
This article covers the evolution of stacking cases in Arkansas and, to a
lesser extent, across the nation. The authors suggest that Arkansas' allegiance
to the diminishing, minority, anti-stacking view is, and has always been,
predicated on an infirm case law foundation. The authors further suggest that
a pro-stacking position would not only be fair to Arkansas insureds, but would
also be in accord with the public policy of Arkansas as found in its uninsured
and underinsured motorist statutes,5 as well as its other statutes. Many other
states have reached that conclusion based on similar statutes.6 A pro-stacking
position would also be consistent with the most recent case handed down by
the Arkansas Supreme Court on the stacking ofunderinsured coverage.7 Thus,
the authors suggest that Arkansas should follow a pro-stacking rule governing
both uninsured and underinsured coverage.
H. "STACKING" AND "ANTI-STACKING CLAUSES" DEFINED

Couch on Insurance says "The term 'stacking' is used to describe a
situation where all available policies are added together to create a larger pool
from which the injured party may draw in order to compensate him for his
2. See 4 Rowland H. Long, THE LAWOFLIABITY INSURANCE § 24.04 (1) (1998) (stating
that stacking is "[o]ne of the most litigated and otherwise controversial aspects of uninsured
motorist coverage today. .. ."); Harrington v. Stevens, 434 S.E.2d 212, 213 (N.C. 1993)
(referring to stacking of uninsured and underinsured motorist coverage as a "fruitful source of
litigation"); Nelson v. Employers Mut. Cas. Co., 217 N.W.2d 670, 673-74 (Wis. 1974)
(referring to the stacking of uninsured coverage as a "subject of considerable discussion").
3. See Wallace, 245 Ark. 230,431 S.W.2d 742; Harris v. Southern Farm Bureau Cas. Ins.
Co., 247 Ark. 961,448 S.W.2d 652 (1970); Holcomb v. Farmers Ins. Exch., 254 Ark. 514,495
S.W.2d 155 (1973); Farm Bureau Mut. Ins. Co. v. Barnhill, 284 Ark. 219, 681 S.W.2d 341
(1984); Crawford v. Emcasco Ins. Co., 294 Ark. 569, 745 S.W.2d 132 (1988); Youngman, 334
Ark. 73, 971 S.W.2d 248. Holcomb and Crawfordwere not stacking cases in that the insureds
did not seek to recover benefits under more than one uninsured coverage. Those cases did,
however, turn on the validity of the same insurance policy clauses which are referred to herein
as "anti-stacking" clauses and thus bear relevance to the stacking debate.
4. Both Youngman, 334 Ark. 73, 971 S.W.2d 248, and Holcomb, 254 Ark. 514, 495
S.W.2d 155, were 4-3 decisions.
5. See ARK. CODE ANN. §§ 23-89-403 & 23-89-209 (Michie Supp. 1997).
6. See infra notes 146 & 147.
7. See Ross v. United Serv. Auto. Ass'n, 320 Ark. 604, 899 S.W.2d 53 (1995).
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actual loss where a single policy is not sufficient to make him whole."'
Stacking, therefore, does not allow an insured to obtain a double recovery or
a windfall of any sort." It merely increases the pool of insurance money
available to an insured who becomes injured. To obtain that money, the
insured still must prove that his injuries justify whatever recovery he seeks.
Although the concept of stacking might be applied to any number of insurance
coverages, this article focuses on the stacking of uninsured and underinsured
motorist coverage.' 0
Insurance companies have sought to reduce their exposure under both
uninsured and underinsured coverages by inserting clauses into their policies
to forbid insureds from stacking those coverages. Those clauses are
sometimes called "other insurance," "excess-escape," "owned-but-notoccupied," or "limit of liability" clauses." No matter what they are called or
how they are worded, they are all intended to prevent stacking. In this article,
the authors will not make distinctions between the different types of such
clauses, but will collectively refer to them as "anti-stacking" clauses. 2
8. See 12A GEORGE J.COUCH, CYCLOPEDIA OF INSURANCE LAW § 45:628, at 77 (2d rev.
ed. 1981 & Supp. 1997). See also LEE R. Russ, COUCH ON INSURANCE § 169:4, at 169-15-16
(3d ed. 1998) ("Stacking is the insured's recovery of damages under more than one policy until
the insured satisfies all of his or her damages or exhausts the limits of all available policies.")
(citing Continental Ins. Co. v. Shives, 492 S.E.2d 808 (S.C. Ct. App. 1997)); PAUL W. PRETZEL,
UNINSURED MOTORISTS § 25.5(B), at 87 (1972) (noting that stacking "usually denotes the
availability of more than one policy to the same insured").
9. See ALAN I. WIDISS, UNINSURED AND UNDERINSURED MOTORIST INSURANCE § 13.12,
at 628 (2d ed. 1992) ("Several of the courts have specifically taken care to point out that
invalidating the other insurance clauses does not abrogate the rule that an insured is only
entitled to recover those damages that were actually sustained and that a claimant may not
recover more than the amount that is necessary to provide complete indemnification."); Russ,
supra note 8, § 169:12, at 169-28 ("It is clear that in the stacking of uninsured motorist
coverages, the injured person may not recover more than his or her actual loss.") (citations
omitted.)
10. The nature of uninsured and underinsured coverage are explained herein at infra notes
18-23 and accompanying text.
11. An example of an "excess-escape" clause is found in Youngman, 334 Ark. at 75, 971
S.W.2d at 249, and reads:
If There Is Other UninsuredMotor Vehicle Coverage ....
3. If the insured sustained bodily injury while occupying a vehicle not owned by
you, your spouse or any relative, this coverage applies:
a.
as excess to any uninsured motor vehicle coverage which applies to the
vehicle as primary coverage, but
b.
only in the amount by which it exceeds the primary coverage.
Id. (emphasis in original).
12. For the curious, however, one commentator addresses some, although not all, of the
distinctions as follows: "Other insurance clauses are generally of three types: (1) calling for
proration of coverage between the multiple policies; (2) stating that the policy will be 'excess'
to any other applicable coverage; (3) seeking to avoid any contribution at all." Russ, supranote
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III. LEGISLATIVE ANDJUDICIAL HISTORY IN ARKANSAS
A.

Legislative History

Stacking disputes arise from statutes. That is because the uninsured and
underinsured coverages which insureds have so persistently sought to stack
oyer the years were written into automobile insurance policies under statutes
providing for those coverages. Those statutes are part of a legislative scheme
designed to ensure that persons injured in car wrecks receive compensation for
their injuries. Looking to the legislative history of Arkansas' uninsured and
underinsured statutes is important not only for context, but also because courts
often look to the legislative history of a statute to determine the intent behind
its enactment, 3 which is important to the stacking debate.
Throughout the previous decades, Arkansas, like many other states,
adopted a number of laws as part of the above-mentioned scheme. In 1965,
it adopted an uninsured motorist statute; 14 in 1973, it adopted a "no-fault"
statute; 5 and, in 1987, it adopted a mandatory liability insurance statute 16 and
8, § 169:9, at 169-23. Similarly, in Woolston v. State FarmMut. Auto. Ins. Co., 306 F. Supp.
738, 741 (W.D. Ark. 1969), U.S. District Judge J. Smith Henley addressed the distinctions as
follows:
Generally speaking, it may be said that there are three types of "other insurance
clauses" that conventionally appear in such policies. One type of clause prohibits
"other insurance," and the policy is void if there is other insurance. Another type
provides that if there is other insurance the coverage provided by the policy in
question is "excess coverage" only. The third type provides that if there is other
insurance a loss is to be prorated between or among the insurers.
Id.
13. See ACW, Inc. v. Weiss, 329 Ark. 302, 313, 947 S.W.2d 770, 775 (1997).
14. See 1965 Ark. Acts 464, codified at ARK. CODE ANN. § 23-89-403 (Michie Supp.
1997).
15. See 1973 Ark. Acts 138, codified at ARK.CODEANN. § 23-89-202 (Michie 1992). The
purpose of the no-fault statute is to make insureds whole on minor automobile injury damage
claims without regard to fault and without expensive and extended litigation. See Aetna Ins. Co.
v. Smith, 263 Ark. 849, 854, 568 S.W.2d 11, 14 (1978). Toward that end, it requires insurance
companies to provide their insureds with minimal levels of medical expense benefits (up to
$5,000), income disability benefits (up to more than $7,000), and death benefits (up to $5,000)
for injuries sustained in car wrecks, regardless of who is at fault. The insured has the option of
rejecting the coverage, but only if he does so in writing.
16. See 1987 Ark. Acts 442, codified at ARK. CODE ANN. § 27-22-104 (Michie Supp.
1997). The mandatory liability insurance statute requires insureds to carry at least $25,000 of
liability insurance collectable by persons they negligently injure in car wrecks. See ARK. CODE
ANN. § 27-22-104(b)(1) (Michie Supp. 1997). There are some exceptions for self-insured and
commercial vehicles. See Phillip D. Oliver, None for the Road: Addressing the Problem of
Uninsured Vehicles and Drivers in Arkansas, 21 U. ARK. LITTLE ROCK L. REv. 167, 170-71
(1998). The statute is designed to eliminate the "judgement-proof" driver. In other words, if
every driver were to comply with the statute, every person injured in a car wreck would have
at least $25,000 of coverage from the negligent driver's insurance company (or would be
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an underinsured motorist statute.' 7 The major points of focus in this article are
the uninsured and underinsured statutes.
The uninsured statute requires insurance companies to include coverage
in policies for the protection of persons insured thereunder who are legally
entitled to recover damages from uninsured motorists." In other words, it
provides for coverage when the negligent driver is not covered by liability
insurance. It must be provided by the insurance company, unless the insured
rejects it.' 9 Theoretically, the uninsured statute removes all uninsured
motorists from the road by putting the injured party in as good a position as
he would have been in had he been injured by a minimally insured motorist.20
The underinsured statute2' was the legislature's attempt to provide
persons injured in car wrecks with something more than minimal coverage.
It requires insurance companies to make at least $25,000 of additional
coverage available to persons injured by drivers carrying liability insurance,
but who nonetheless have insufficient coverage or resources to fully
compensate those persons for their injuries. It can only be rejected by the
insured in writing.22 The fact that underinsured coverage is intended toflly
compensate injured parties, rather than minimally compensate them, provides
an additional reason for allowing insureds to stack underinsured coverage.2 3
That is because insureds are often unable to achieve full compensation without
stacking underinsured coverage.

allowed to split a pool of $50,000 ifmore than one person were injured). However, as Professor
Oliver writes, a comparison of the data submitted by insurance companies and the state's
records of registered vehicles indicates that approximately 17% of the vehicles registered in
Arkansas are not insured and that there is no means of ascertaining the number of vehicles that
are neither registered nor insured. See id. at 175.
17. See 1987 Ark. Acts 335, codified at ARK. CODE ANN. § 23-89-209 (Michie Supp.
1997).

18. See ARK. CODE ANN. § 23-89-403(a) (Michie Supp. 1997).
19. See ARK. CODE ANN. § 23-89-403(b) (Michie Supp. 1997).
20. See Winslow Drummond, UninsuredMotorist Coverage-A SuggestedApproach to

Consistency,23 ARK. L. REV. 167 (1969) (suggesting that an uninsured motorist statute would,
theoretically, remove all uninsured motor vehicles from the highways because an insured was
guaranteed, in effect, that any vehicle with which he might collide would be covered by liability
insurance either through a policy applicable to the other vehicle or through his own policy).
21.

See ARK. CODE ANN.

§ 23-89-209.

22. See ARK. CODE ANN. § 32-89-209(a)(1).
23. This is discussed more thoroughly herein at infra notes 153-159 and accompanying
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Judicial History
1.

Early Stacking Cases

The Arkansas Supreme Court considered the issue of stacking, in a
different context, even before Arkansas enacted the uninsured and underinsured statutes. In 1962, three years before the first of those two statutes (the
uninsured statute) was enacted, the court considered whether an insured would
be allowed to stack two medical expense coverages from a policy covering
two cars.24 In a unanimous opinion written by Justice George Rose Smith, the
court allowed the insured to stack. Noting that a separate premium had been
paid for each coverage, Justice Smith said it was reasonable to think that the
second premium was intended to afford "some corresponding added benefit"
to the insured.' Stated another way, where a premium is paid, coverage
should be afforded. Justice Smith and the court reached their decision despite
an anti-stacking clause in the policy. The clause was ambiguous and thus
invalid.26
Five years later, in 1967, Justice Smith again wrote for a unanimous court
on stacking.27 That time, however, the court forbade the insured from stacking
funeral benefit coverage from two policies. Finding the anti-stacking clause
unambiguous, the court upheld it. In time, the court would come to follow a
rule emerging from the above two cases, i.e., an insured may stack coverage,
but only in the absence of an unambiguous anti-stacking clause. Practically
speaking, that means that Arkansas became an anti-stacking state, as insurance
companies invariably include anti-stacking clauses in their policies, and they
have been able over time to eliminate most of the ambiguous language. Each
case in which a court finds a clause to be ambiguous is an opportunity for the
insurance companies to further refine their policies to eventually appease the
courts on their policy language. Arkansas' anti-stacking rule, however, has
always been in the minority, has seen much of its underpinnings vanish, has
twice come within one vote of being overruled,2" and may be vulnerable to
being overruled by a newly constituted court even today.

24. See Kansas City Fire & Marine Ins. Co. v. Epperson, 234 Ark. 1100, 356 S.W.2d 613

(1962).
25. See id. at 1102, 356 S.W.2d at 614.
26.
27.
28.
S.W.2d

See id.
See Varvil v. M.F.A. Mut. Ins. Co., 243 Ark. 692, 421 S.W.2d 346 (1967).
See Youngman, 334 Ark. 73, 971 S.W.2d 248; see also Holcomb, 254 Ark. 514, 495
155.

STACKING

1999]

2.

Cases Involving Stacking UninsuredCoverage

Most stacking cases, in Arkansas and elsewhere, involve uninsured
coverage, rather than underinsured coverage. That is because uninsured
coverage arrived on the scene first. Arkansas, for example, enacted an
uninsured statute 22 years before it enacted an underinsured statute.2 9 The
first case arising from Arkansas and concerning the stacking of uninsured
coverage was decided in federal court, not state court. In 1967, in Robey v.
Safeco Ins. Co. of America,30 U.S. District Judge John Miller surveyed the
stacking decisions from across the nation. In accord with them, he allowed the
insured to stack uninsured coverage under the Arkansas uninsured statute,
despite anti-stacking clauses in the insurance policies. Judge Miller said,
There is no provision under the Arkansas law that prevents an insurance
company from issuing as many policies to an insured as it may be able to
sell, and such insured is entitled to collect under the policies the full
amount of injuries within the limits of the policies suffered by him
proximately caused by the negligence of an uninsured motorist.3
That might be reworded to say "If you collect the premiums, you pay the
benefits."
The victory in Robey I was not complete for the insured. Judge Miller
held that the anti-stacking clauses in two policies issued to the same insured
by the same insurance company, Safeco, were not applicable "with respect to
each other."32 With little explanation, however, he treated the anti-stacking
clauses as valid with respect to a third policy issued by another insurance
company. To the extent, therefore, that the insured had already collected
benefits from the other insurance company, his recovery from Safeco was
reduced. Otherwise, the insured was allowed to collect the full uninsured
benefits under the two Safeco policies, regardless of the anti-stacking clauses
contained therein.
A three-judge panel of the Eighth Circuit Court of Appeals affirmed
Judge Miller's decision without dissent.33 Like Judge Miller's opinion before
29. The uninsured statute was enacted by Act No. 464 of 1965. The underinsured statute
vas enacted by Act No. 335 of 1987.
30. 270 F. Supp. 473 (W.D. Ark. 1967) ("Robey F'), affid in part by Safeco Ins. Co. of
America v. Robey, 339 F.2d 330 (8th Cir. 1968) ("Robey IX").
31. Id. at 486-87.
32. Id. at 487.
33. See Robey II, 399 F.2d 330.
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it, the Eighth Circuit's opinion was thoroughly researched, containing an indepth survey of the nation's stacking decisions. Widiss would later refer to
the Eighth Circuit's opinion as "widely discussed and cited." 4 Following its
research, the Eighth Circuit said the "sounder view of the law" was found in
those cases holding that anti-stacking clauses violated the minimum protection
requirements of uninsured statutes." The Eighth Circuit also quoted from one
court which said that to permit an insured to collect a premium and then
exclude coverage through an anti-stacking clause "shocks the conscience of
'
this court."36
Between the date of Judge Miller's opinion in Robey I and the date that
the Eighth Circuit affirmed it in Robey II, a second uninsured stacking case
was decided in an Arkansas federal court." There, U.S. District Judge J.
Smith Henley, who was later elevated to the Eighth Circuit, also allowed the
insured to stack uninsured coverage, deferring to Judge Miller's "thorough
consideration" of the issue in Robey1.3s Thus, as of August of 1968, two U.S.
District Judges from Arkansas and a unanimous three-judge panel of the
Eighth Circuit Court of Appeals had sided with the majority view in favor of
stacking uninsured coverage (at least with regard to policies issued to the same
insured by the same insurance company) regardless of whether anti-stacking
clauses were written into the policies. Arkansas was, at least in part, a prostacking state.
That changed the very next month. In September of 1968, the Arkansas
Supreme Court considered the stacking of uninsured coverage for the first
time in MF.A. Ins. Co. v. Wallace.39 In a two-page opinion, it held contrary
to Judges Miller and Henley of Arkansas, contrary to the Eighth Circuit, and
contrary to the long list of pro-stacking cases analyzed in the two Robey
opinions. The Arkansas Supreme Court upheld an anti-stacking clause in
Wallace, saying that it was not repugnant to the uninsured statute and was,
therefore, valid.
Wallace was soon criticized for its weak underpinnings, particularly its
reliance on Maryland Casualty Co. v. Howe.' Because Wallace relies on
34. See WiDIss, supra note 9, § 13.6, at 582.
35. See Robey II, 399 F.2d at 335-36.
36. See id. at 338 (quoting from Kraft v. Allstate, 431 P.2d 917, 920 (Ariz. Ct. App.
1967)). For a discussion of other courts finding anti-stacking clauses to be unconscionable, see
infra note 147.
37. See Childers v. Southern Farm Bureau Cas. Ins. Co., 282 F. Supp. 866 (E.D. Ark.
1968).
38. See id. at 869.
39. 245 Ark. 230, 431 S.W.2d 742 (1968).
40. 213 A.2d 420 (N.H. 1965), overruledby Courtemanche v. Lumbermans Mut. Cas. Co.,
385 A.2d 105 (N.H. 1978); Vigneault v. Travelers Ins. Co., 382 A.2d 910 (N.H. 1978).
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Howe, it is necessary to analyze Howe to determine the integrity of Wallace.
A U.S. District Judge in Indiana did just that in 1970, two years after Wallace
was handed down. The Indiana judge analyzed the then-existing uninsured
stacking cases, including Wallace, in the course of invalidating an antistacking clause involved in the case before him."' Howe lacked value in the
eyes of the Indianajudge because it relied on three cases which in turn lacked
value. Thus, in the eyes of the Indiana judge, Wallace also lacked value.
The first case relied on by Howe was an Iowa state court case which was
decided four years before Iowa enacted an uninsured statute and was thus
"completely lacking in authority" in situations where an uninsured statute was
involved.42 The second was a Fourth Circuit Court of Appeals decision
projecting that the Virginia Supreme Court would adopt an anti-stacking
rule.43 That decision "lost all of its vitality," the Indianajudge reasoned, when
the Supreme Court of Virginia specifically rejected it and held an anti44
stacking clause to be invalid in contravention ofVirginia's uninsured statute.
The third was a decision in which the Fifth Circuit Court of Appeals held an
anti-stacking clause to be enforceable under Florida law.45 It too was rejected
by that state's Supreme Court as being in conflict with the Florida uninsured
statute. 46
The Indiana judge concluded that the underpinnings of Howe had been
"totally undermined," which in turn meant, according to the Indiana judge,
that the Arkansas Supreme Court's decision in Wallace, which relied on
Howe, had been undermined.47 U.S. District Judge Oren Harris later
recounted the Indiana court's analysis of Wallace in his 1978 overview of the
history of stacking cases in Arkansas, writing that the Indiana judge had
"dismissed" Wallace as "devoid of precedential value" due to the weakness
of Howe.4" Howe itself has now been overruled.49
There were no dissents in Wallace. That, however, changed five years
later, in 1973, when the Arkansas Supreme Court next considered an

41. See Simpson v State Farm Mut. Auto. Ins. Co., 318 F. Supp. 1152 (S.D. Ind. 1970).
42. See Simpson, 318 F. Supp at 1154 (discussing Burcham v. Farmers Ins. Exch., 121
N.W.2d 500 (Iowa 1963)).
43. See Travelers Indem. Co. v. Wells, 316 F.2d 770 (4th Cir. 1963).
44. See Simpson, 318 F. Supp at 1155 (citing Bryant v. State Farm Mut. Auto. Ins. Co.,
140 S.E.2d 817 (Va. 1963), as specifically disapproving Travelers, 316 F.2d 770).
45. See Chandler v. Government Employees Ins. Co., 342 F.2d 420 (5th Cir. 1965).
46. See Simpson, 318 F. Supp. at 1155 (citing Sellers v. United States Fidelity & Guar.
Co., 185 So.2d 689 (Fla. 1966), as repudiating Chandler,342 F.2d 420).
47. See Simpson, 318 F. Supp. at 1155.
48. See Dugal v. Commercial Standard Ins. Co., 456 F. Supp. 290,295 (W.D. Ark. 1978).
49. See supra note 40.
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uninsured anti-stacking clause in Holcomb v. FarmersIns. Exch.5" The court
again upheld the anti-stacking clause, but a division emerged among the seven
justices, three of whom dissented. Justice John Fogleman, writing for all
three, said that he regretted seeing the court align itself with the "pitifully
small minority." 51
Like Wallace,Holcomb has been criticized. Most pointedly, Justice John
Purtle, of the Arkansas Supreme Court, criticized Holcomb in a dissenting
opinion written 15 years later in another stacking case, Crawfordv. Emcasco
Ins. Co." Justice Purtle pointed out that one of the three cases relied on by the
majority in Holcomb was overruled just two years after being decided (and
seven months before Holcomb was handed down). 3 There, an Illinois
appellate court decided that upholding an anti-stacking clause would
contravene the Illinois uninsured statute, as well as the "weight and trend of
authority," a reference to the pro-stacking majority.54 A second case relied on
by the majority in Holcomb was overruled by the Arizona Supreme Court,
which likewise found anti-stacking clauses to be violative of that state's
uninsured statute." A third case relied upon by the majority in Holcomb lost
part of its vitality when the Nebraska Supreme Court held contrary to it in
1970, two years after it was decided and three years before Holcomb was
handed down.56

50. 254 Ark. 514, 495 S.W.2d 155 (1973).
dissenting) (joining
51. See Holcomb, 254 Ark. at 523,495 S.W.2d at 160 (Fogleman, J.,
Fogleman, J., in his dissent were Harris, C.J., and George Rose Smith, J.).
dissenting).
52. 294 Ark. at 573, 745 S.W.2d at 135 (Purtle, J.,
53. See id. at 574, 745 S.W.2d at 135 (Purtle, J., dissenting) (citing Doxtater v. State Farm
App. Ct. 1972), as overruling McElyea v. Safeway Ins.
Mut. Auto. Ins. Co., 290 N.E.2d 284 (I11.
Co., 266 N.E.2d 146 (Ill. App. Ct. 1970)).
54. See Doxtater, 290 N.E.2d at 289.
55. See Calvert v. Farmers Ins. Co. of Arizona, 697 P.2d 684 (Ariz. 1985) (overruling
Owens v. Allied Mut. Ins. Co., 487 P.2d 402 (Ariz. Ct. App. 1971)). Owens had the added
weakness of being an expressly limited holding. That is, the 3-2 majority said "we do wish to
emphasize that our opinion here is limitedto the fact situation before the court and the particular
policy considerations inherent in that fact situation." Owens, 487 P.2d at 403-04 (emphasis
added). Because that fact situation did not involve stacking, the court's holding could not be
said to extend to stacking cases.
56. In Bose v. American FamilyMut. Ins. Co., 181 N.W.2d 839 (Neb. 1970), the Nebraska
Supreme Court held contrary to Shipley v. American StandardIns. Co., 158 N.W.2d 238 (Neb.
1968), which the Arkansas Supreme Court cited in Holcomb, 254 Ark. at 520, 495 S.W.2d at
158. Although it did not overrule Shipley, the Nebraska Supreme Court, in Bose, held an antistacking clause to be invalid as against the spirit of Nebraska's uninsured statute and the
insured's reasonable expectations. See Bose, 181 N.W.2d at 841. Eleven years later, in 1981,
the Nebraska Supreme Court opted to follow Bose, and not Shipley, in Eich v. State FarmMut.
Auto. Ins. Co., 305 N.W.2d 621, 625 (Neb. 1981). Nebraska was one of 29 states which the
Wisconsin Supreme Court listed as being in thepro-stacking majority in 1974. See infra note
105.
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Continuing with his criticism of Holcomb, Justice Purtle said that the
Arkansas uninsured statute required insurance companies to issue uninsured
coverage "for the protection ofpersons" which was distinguishable from the
insurance company's "attempt to make the coverage vehicular. ' 57 On that
basis, he said, Holcomb could not stand scrutiny under the uninsured statute.5 8
The Arkansas Supreme Court has twice been invited to overrule Holcomb, but
has so far passed.59
Crawford,the forum for Justice Purtle's criticism of Holcomb, is another
anti-stacking decision afflicted with weak underpinnings. The Crawford
majority relied on one case that has since been overturned and another that
was overruled three years before Crawford was decided. 6' In each case, the
overturning or overruling court emphasized that uninsured coverage was
personal in nature, not vehicular,6' just as Justice Purtle argued in his
dissenting opinion in Crawford.62
The last case from the Arkansas Supreme Court on stacking uninsured
coverage was Youngman v. State Farm Mut. Auto. Ins., which was handed
down in 1998.63 Youngman was another 4-3 decision, just as Holcomb had
been 25 years earlier. Following the doctrine of stare decisis, the court
disallowed stacking, despite acknowledging that, "According to Widiss, thirty57. See Crawford, 294 Ark. at 573, 745 S.W.2d at 135 (Purtle, J., dissenting) (quoting
from ARK. CODE ANN. § 23-89-403(a) (emphasis added)).
58. See id. (Purtle, J., dissenting).
59. InLuckyv. Equity Mut. Ins. Co., 259 Ark. 846, 849, 537 S.W.2d 160, 162 (1976), the
court declined an invitation to overrule Holcomb, saying that the construction given in Holcomb
to the uninsured statute had "become as much a part of the statute as the words of the General
Assembly." Id. In Crawford,294 Ark. at 571, 745 S.W.2d at 134, the court again declined the
chance to overrule Holcomb, saying that, although Holcomb represented the minority view, that
view had since "gained acceptance (or remained the rule) in a number of other jurisdictions."
Id. That statement lends itself to criticism, as discussed herein, given that the consensus among
commentators is that the anti-stacking view is, and long has been, in decline. See infra notes
104-116 and accompanying text.
60. See Crawford,294 Ark. at 571,745 S.W.2d at 134 (citing Safeco Ins. Co. of America
v. Hubbard, 578 S.W.2d 49 (Ky. 1979), overruled by Chaffin v. Kentucky Farm Bureau Ins.
Co., 789 S.W.2d 754 (Ky. 1990) & Rodriguez v. Maryland Indem. Ins. Co., 539 P.2d 196 (Ariz.
Ct. App. 1975)), overruled by Calvert v. Farmers Ins. Co. of Arizona, 697 P.2d 684 (Ariz.
1985)).
61. In Chaffin, the Kentucky Supreme Court wrote that, in its previous decision in
Hubbard,it had failed to take into account the "personal nature of uninsured motorist coverage
or the insured's reasonable expectations with regard to insurance coverage which has been
bought and paid for," which made Hubbard "erroneous" and "contrary to the public policy of
Kentucky." Chaffin, 789 S.W.2d at 757-58. In Calvert,the Arizona Court of Appeals said "our
Uninsured Motorist Act was created 'for the protection of persons,' and not for the protection
of the insured vehicle." Calvert, 697 P.2d at 689.
62. Crawford,294 Ark. at 573, 745 S.W.2d at 135 (Purtle, J., dissenting).
63. 334 Ark. 73, 971 S.W.2d 248 (1998).
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six states have rejected other insurance clauses on a variety of bases."'
Writing for the three dissenting justices, Justice Donald Corbin argued that it
was time to overrule the precedent.65 The authors of this article agree.
3.

Cases Involving Stacking UnderinsuredCoverage

The Arkansas Supreme Court has only twice considered cases involving
the stacking of underinsuredcoverage, as opposed to uninsuredcoverage. It
reached different results each time. In 1992, the court handed down the first
of those two decisions in Clampitv. State FarmMutualAutomobile Insurance
Co.' There, the court decided that an anti-stacking clause did not violate
either the underinsured statute or the public policy of Arkansas.67 Thus, the
court upheld the clause as valid. The court also said that the law of other
jurisdictions was in a "transitional stage" and the jurisdictions in the minority
had not diminished.6" That contravenes the authorities discussed in this
article, which support the proposition that the trend has always been in favor
of stacking.69
The Clampit majority quoted most extensively from a decision by the
Idaho Supreme Court in Dullenty v. Rocky Mountain Fire & Casualty Co.7 °
Dullenty, however, constitutes another weak underpinning in that the 3-2
majority there stressed that its holding did not reach certain stacking
scenarios.7 The Dullenty majority did not rule, for instance, that an insured
who paid separate premiums for coverages could not stack them.72 Justice
Corbin pointed out as much in his dissent.73 The two dissenting justices in
Dullenty further pointed out that the holding of the three-justice majority was
against the "overwhelming majority."74 The Clampit majority also relied on
64. Youngman, 334 Ark. at 79, 971 S.W.2d at 251.
65. See id.at 80-82, 971 S.W.2d at 251-52 (Corbin, J., dissenting).
66. 309 Ark. 107, 828 S.W.2d 593 (1992).
67. See id. at 107, 828 S.W.2d at 594.
68. See id. at 114, 828 S.W.2d at 597.
69. See infra notes 104-116 and accompanying text.
70. 721 P.2d 198 (Idaho 1986) (overruled on other grounds by Colonial Penn Franklin Ins.
Co. v. Welch, 811 P.2d 838 (Idaho 1991)).
71. The Dullenty majority said "We do not speak to and specificallyreserve the question
in a circumstance as is presented in Hammon [v. Farmers Insurance Group, 107 Idaho 770, 692
P.2d 1202 (1984)] where an insured under two or more motor vehicle liability policies, each
issued by the same carrier, and each of which insures a separate vehicle, and in each of which
policies issued by the same carrier the insured has elected to and paid a premium for uninsured
motorist coverage." Dullenty, 721 P.2d at 206-07 (emphasis added).
72. See id.
73. See Clampit, 309 Ark. at 115, 828 S.W.2d at 598 (Corbin, J., dissenting).
74. See Dullenty, 721 P.2d at 215 (Huntley, J., dissenting, with the concurrence of
Bistline, J.).
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a Florida case which provided weak precedential value in that Florida, unlike
Arkansas, had temporarily outlawed, by statute, the stacking of uninsured
coverage.75 The Clampit majority relied on five cases that did not involve
stacking in any form,76 and it relied on one case in which the court actually
allowedthe insured to stack underinsured coverage.7 7
The logic used by the court in Clampit is also troublesome. The court
"concede[d] the distinction" between uninsured and underinsured coverage.78
Uninsured coverage, it said, was designed to provide the "minimum recovery"
required by law.79 Underinsured coverage, on the other hand, was designed
to provide compensation "to the extent of the injury, subject to the policy
limit."8 0 Despite conceding that distinction, the court said "we fail to see how
the distinction would change the result in Crawford, nor does appellant
suggest how it would."" The point being pressed by the insureds in Clampit,
however, was that giving effect to the purpose behind underinsured coverage
would have allowed the insureds to collect more than the minimum recovery
required by law ($25,000), but instead to collect, through stacking, damages
"to the extent of injury," or as close thereto as possible. 2
75. See Clampit, 309 Ark. at 115, 828 S.W.2d at 597 (citing New Hampshire Insurance
Group v. Harbach, 439 So. 2d 1383 (Fla. 1983) (in turn citing FLA. STAT. ANN. § 627.4132
(West 1976)). The Florida anti-stacking statute was later amended to remove uninsured
coverage from the kinds of coverage that could not be stacked. See Harbach, 439 So. 2d at
1385.
76. See Clampit, 309 Ark. at 114-15, 828 S.W.2d at 597 (citing Williams-Diehl v. State
Farm Fire and Cas. Co., 793 P.2d 587 (Colo. Ct. App. 1989); Deel v. Sweeney, 383 S.E.2d 92
(W. Va. 1989); Clark v. State Farm Mut. Auto. Ins. Co., 743 P.2d 1227 (Utah 1987); Equitable
Gen. Ins. Co. v. Williams, 620 S.W.2d 608 (Tex. App. 1981); Hill v. Nationwide Mut. Ins. Co.,
535 S.W.2d 327 (Tenn. 1976)). In each of the above cases, an insured failed to qualify for a
single coverage. In none of them did an insured seek to stack two or more coverages.
77. See Clampit, 309 Ark. at 113, 828 S.W.2d at 597 (citing Veach v. Farmers Ins. Co.,
460 N.W.2d 845, 848 (Iowa 1990). Noting that the purpose of uninsured coverage was "to
ensure minimum compensation to victims of uninsured motorists," while the goal of
underinsured coverage was "full compensation," the court in Veach allowed the insured to stack
underinsured coverage. Veach, 460 N.W.2d at 848.
78. See Clampit, 309 Ark. at 109, 828 S.W.2d at 595.
79. See id. at 109, 828 S.W.2d at 595. Pursuant to ARK. CODE. ANN. § 27-22-104(b)(1),
the minimum recovery required by law includes $25,000 of coverage for bodily injury or death
to any one person in any one car wreck.
80. Id. at 110, 828 S.W.2d at 595.
81. Id.
82. In their appeal brief, the appellants-insureds in Clampit wrote,
State Farm can be expected to direct the Court's attention to the case of Holcomb
v. Farmers Ins. Exchg., 254 Ark. 514, 495 S.W.2d 155 (1973) and its progeny
which, if broadly read, hold that a similar "other vehicle" exclusion prevents the
stacking of uninsured motorist coverages. Appellants are equally quick to point out
that these cases do not address underinsured motorist coverage. This is an important
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Also problematic is the Clampit majority's reliance on the Iowa case of
Kluiterv. State Farm Mut. Auto. Ins. Co. 3 The Clampitmajority said that the
Kluiter court drew "no distinction" between uninsured and underinsured
motorist coverage. 4 Given that the Clampit court had already acknowledged
that there was such a distinction, Kluiter would seem to have little precedential value. Of greater precedential value is that, in 1990, three years after
the Iowa Supreme Court handed down Kluiter and two years before the
Arkansas Supreme Court handed down Clampit, the Iowa Supreme Court did
draw a distinction between uninsured and underinsured coverage and8 allowed
5
an insured to stack underinsured coverage based on that distinction.
distinction. The basic purpose of uninsured motorist coverage is to enable a person
purchasing an automobile liability insurance policy "to obtain for an additional
premium protection against death or injuries at the hands of an uninsured motorist
as they would have had if that motorist had obtained for himself the minimum
coverage required by the Safety Responsibility Act." Childers v. Southern Farm
Bur. Cas. Ins. Co., 282 F. Supp. 866, 868 (E.D. Ark. 1968). On the other hand, the
basic thrust of underinsured motorist coverage is to fully compensate an insured for
his damages. See 7 Am. Jur. 2d, Automobile Insurance § 322 (1980). It assumes
that the minimal liability coverage set by law is simply not enough in many cases to
make the injured insured whole, an end that the General Assembly has found should
be accomplished. See Ark. Code Ann. § 23-89-209 and Acts amendatory thereof.
Abstract and Brief for Appellants at 29-30, Clampit v. State Farm Mut. Auto. Ins. Co., 309 Ark.
107 (1992) (No. 91-285) (emphasis in original).
83. 417 N.W.2d 74 (Iowa 1987).
84. See Clampit, 309 Ark. at 110, 828 S.W.2d at 595.
85. The words of the Iowa Supreme Court on this issue from Veach v. FarmersIns. Co.,
460 N.W. 845, 848 (Iowa 1990), are worth repeating at length:
We are aware that we have upheld a "not-owned-but-insured" [i.e., antistacking] clause in the uninsured motorist context. The difference in treatment
between uninsured motorist and underinsured motorist coverage is due to the
differing objectives of each type of coverage.
The purpose of uninsured motorist coverage is to ensure minimum
compensation to victims of uninsured motorists. The goal of underinsured motorist
coverage, on the other hand, is full compensation to the victim to the extent of the
injuries suffered. We have adopted a "broad coverage" view of underinsured
motorist coverage, while taking a "narrow coverage" view of uninsured motorist
coverage. This means that benefits that are duplicative in the uninsured motorist
context are not necessarily so in the underinsured motorist context.
In the case of both uninsured motorist and underinsured motorist coverage we
look to see whether the goal of the type of insurance involved will be met. With
uninsured motorist coverage this means looking to see whether the insured will
receive minimum compensation as set by statute. With underinsured motorist
coverage it means looking to see if the victim will be fully compensated. Because
Greg Veach has not yet been fully compensated, the enforcement of the "not-ownedbut-insured" [i.e., anti-stacking] clause would frustrate the purpose of underinsured
motorist coverage.
Because the "owned-but-not-insured" [i.e., anti-stacking] clause in this case
frustrates the purpose of underinsured motorist coverage and because it is contrary
to "common sense and the consuming public's general understanding of coverage
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The insured fared better before the Arkansas Supreme Court in the
second underinsured stacking decision in Ross v. UnitedServices Automobile
Ass 'n,"6 handed down in 1995, three years after Clampit. In Ross, the court
framed the issue as whether the insured could stack underinsured coverage
"when underinsured coverage is implied by operation of law."8" At the time
that she was injured by an underinsured motorist, the insured in Ross was
covered by a policy encompassing four family vehicles."8 The policy did not
contain underinsured coverage, and the insured had not paid any premiums for
that coverage. 9 The insurance company, however, did not have written proof
that the insured had rejected underinsured coverage, even though the
underinsured statute said that any such rejection had to be made "in writing.'
By operation of law, therefore, the court implied underinsured coverage to
exist for each vehicle in the minimum amount required under the underinsured
motorist statute, or $25,000 per vehicle. 9 The insurance company did not
dispute that. It did dispute the insured's contention that she should be allowed
to stack the four underinsured coverages that had been implied to exist. The
court looked to other jurisdictions for guidance and found only two cases in
which courts had considered the issue of stacking underinsured coverage
implied by law. In both cases, the courts had allowed the insureds to stack the
underinsured coverage. In neither, however, did the courts indicate that
stacking should be limited to those cases where coverage was implied by
operation of law.92
under these circumstances," we hold that the exclusion is invalid. The foal of full
compensation has not been met in this case. The ruling of the district court on this
point is affirmed. [All citations omitted.]
86. 320 Ark. 604, 899 S.W.2d 53 (1995).
87. See id. at 605, 899 S.W.2d at 54.
88. See id.
89. This is evidenced by the fact that underinsured coverage was implied to exist by
operation of law because there was no signed rejection for the coverage. See id. at 606, 899
S.W.2d at 54.
90. See ARK. CODE ANN. § 23-89-209(a)(1).
91. See Ross, 320 Ark. at 606, 899 S.W.2d at 54 (citing Shelter Mutual Ins. Co. v. Irvin,
309 Ark. 331, 831 S.W.2d 135 (1992); Shelter Mutual Ins. Co. v. Bough, 310 Ark. 21, 834
S.W.2d 637 (1992)).
at 609, 899 S.W.2d at 56 (citing Holman v. All Nation Ins. Co., 288 N.W.2d
92. See id.
244 (Minn. 1980); Riffle v. State Farm Mut. Auto Ins. Co., 186 W.Va. 54, 410 S.E.2d 413
(1991)). In the first case, the Minnesota Supreme Court wrote that the "declared policy of this
court" was to stack first-party coverage, without drawing a line between coverage obtained by
the payment of premiums and that obtained by operation of law. See Holman, 288 N.W.2d at
251. In the second case, the West Virginia Supreme Court of Appeals did not even mention
"stacking," except in a footnote which read "We have previously permitted the stacking of
underinsured motorist coverage." See Riffle, 410 S.E.2d at 414 n.2 (citing State Auto. Ins. Co.
v. Youler, 396 S.E.2d 737 (W. Va. 1990)).
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Importantly, the court in Ross looked to the language of the Arkansas
underinsured statute. The relevant portion of that language required insurance
companies to provide underinsured coverage (unless rejected in writing) for
"any" motor vehicle. 3 From that, the court concluded "[b]ecause we find the
statute requires the insurance company to offer as a minimum, underinsured
coverage for each car, we further conclude that when an insured has more than
one car covered with the insurance company, the insured may stack the
minimum coverages that should have been offered."94 Thus, the court allowed
the insured to stack underinsured coverage of $25,000 for each of four cars,
for a total of $100,000.
Many courts have invalidated anti-stacking clauses under the same
reasoning that the Arkansas Supreme Court used in Ross, but without limiting
their holdings to cases where the coverage came into existence by operation
of law. Interestingly, the court's reasoning in Ross closely tracked that of an
opinion written 30 years earlier by a Virginia appellate court and discussed in
Judge Miller's above-mentioned opinion in Robey I, the first uninsured
stacking case to arise from Arkansas. In the Virginia case, the court was faced
with deciding the validity of an anti-stacking clause under an uninsured statute
which was, in Judge Miller's words, "practically identical" to the Arkansas
uninsured statute.95 The Virginia court held in favor of stacking because,
quite simply, that state's uninsured statute required that uninsured coverage
be included in insurance policies and thus such coverage could not be taken
away by anti-stacking clauses.96 "That is the plain language," the court wrote.
"It means that every such policy shall so undertake. There is no limitation or
qualification of this language anywhere in the statute, nothing at all to indicate
' An Indiana judge ruled accordingly,
that it does not mean what it says."97
writing that "[s]ince the [uninsured] statutes simply provide that each policy
of insurance issued must contain uninsured motorist protection in minimum
amounts, without qualification except as noted, it follows that any attempt on
the part of an insurance company to limit the effect of such clauses must be
in derogation of the statute."98 Similarly, a Pennsylvania court invalidated an
anti-stacking clause because it was "in derogation of and repugnant to the
Uninsured Motorist Act which requires uninsured motorist coverage in all
policies of insurance with respect to each motor vehicle." 9
93. See id. at 609, 899 S.W.2d at 56 (citing ARK. CODE ANN. § 23-89-209(a)).
94.
95.
205 Va.
96.
97.
98.

Id. at 610, 899 S.W.2d at 56 (first emphasis original; second emphasis added).
See Robey 1,270 F. Supp. at 482 (discussing Bryant v. State Farm Mut. Auto. Ins. Co.,
897, 140 S.E.2d 817 (Va. Ct. App. 1965)).
See id. (quoting from Bryant, supra).
Id.
Simpson, 318 F.Supp. at 1156.

99. Sones v. Aetna Cas. & Sur. Co., 411 A.2d 552, 554 (Pa. Super. Ct. 1979) (emphasis
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Although the issue framed in Ross was whether stacking would be
allowed "when underinsured coverage is implied by operation of law,"" ° logic
and fairness do not support limiting the holding of Ross to those rare cases in
which coverage is implied by operation of law. Ross is best viewed as a
public policy case. The public policy of Arkansas is found in its constitution
and, more importantly here, its statutes.10 ' In Ross, the court looked to the
underinsured statute and found therein language favoring the stacking of
underinsured coverage. It should not matter whether that coverage came into
existence by operation of law or the payment of premiums. Once the coverage
exists, by whatever means, it is governed by the language of the underinsured
statute. If that language favors stacking, as the Court found in Ross, it favors
stacking no matter how the coverage came into existence. Thus, logic
suggests that the holding of Ross should be extended to cases in which the
underinsured coverage came into existence through the insured's payment of
premiums. That would also be the fair result. Otherwise, the only insureds
who would qualify to stack underinsured coverage would be those who did not
pay for it, but who instead had the fortune to happen upon such coverage by
operation of law.
Although the court indicated at the end of its opinion in Ross that the
02
anti-stacking clause involved there was either ambiguous or not on point,1
that did not transform Ross from a public policy case into an ambiguity case.
The majority's opinion in Ross did not turn on ambiguity. Before addressing
the ambiguity (or non-applicability) of the anti-stacking clause, the court had
already reached its conclusion in favor of stacking by looking to the language
of the underinsured statute, where public policy is found. Once the court
determined that clauses purporting to forbid the stacking of underinsured
coverage ran contrary to the language of the underinsured statute, ambiguity
became an academic issue. That is because once anti-stacking clauses are
declared to run counter to the language of a statute, they become invalid,
whether ambiguous or not.'0 3 While it may not be possible to reconcile Ross
with Clampit, Ross followed Clampitby three years and has the advantage of
being the court's last pronouncement on stacking underinsured coverage.

added) (discussed in WIDISs, supra note 9, § 13.15, at 645).
100. Ross, 320 Ark. at 608, 899 S.W.2d at 56.
101. See Sterling Drug, Inc. v. Oxford, 294 Ark. 239, 249, 743 S.W.2d 380, 385 (1988).
102. See Ross, 320 Ark. at 610, 899 S.W.2d at 56.
103. See also WIDISS, supranote 9, § 13.15, at 644 (discussing Allstate Ins. Co. v. Maglish,
586 P.2d 313, 315 (Nev. 1978), where the court said "Although we question whether the
liability limiting clause is unequivocal as alleged by Allstate, we need not address that issue
since the clause is void if contrary to public policy ....).
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IV. THE NATIONAL TREND IN FAVOR OF STACKING
Across the country, the anti-stacking view has always been, and remains,
the minority view. As mentioned above, in the 4-3 decision handed down by
the Arkansas Supreme Court in Holcomb in 1973, the three dissenting justices
expressed their regret that Arkansas had aligned itself with the "pitifully small
minority" of states upholding anti-stacking clauses."0 The following year,
1974, the Wisconsin Supreme Court listed 29 states among the pro-stacking
majority and only nine, including Arkansas, among the anti-stacking
minority."°5 In 1981, Couch declared "the trend appears to be in favor of
stacking" and cited cases from 28 states in which anti-stacking clauses had
been declared invalid."° That same year, the United States Supreme Court
acknowledged a Minnesota Supreme Court opinion which "emphasized that
a majority of States allow stacking and that legal decisions allowing stacking
'are fairly recent and well considered in light of current uses of
automobiles."'' 0 7 Four years later, in 1985, the Arizona Supreme Court
counted 26 states that had found anti-stacking clauses to be invalid in
contravention of uninsured statutes,' and two states were added to that list
a year later, for another count of 28 pro-stacking states."°
The trend proved to be the same for underinsured coverage once cases
involving that form of insurance began to accumulate. In 1995, Widiss said
there was a "substantial body" ofjudicial precedent which affirmed the right
of an insured to stack underinsured coverage." 0 Widiss cited cases from 20

104. See Holcomb, 254 Ark. at 523, 495 S.W.2d at 160 (Fogleman, J.,
dissenting, joined
by Harris, C.J., and George Rose Smith, J.).
105. See Nelson v. Employers Mut. Cas. Co., 217 N.W.2d 670, 673-74 nn. 2-3 (1974).

Among the pro-stacking majority, the court listed Alabama, Alaska, Arizona, Colorado, Florida,
Georgia, Indiana, Kansas, Kentucky, Louisiana, Massachusetts, Michigan, Minnesota,
Mississippi, Missouri, Nebraska, Nevada, New Jersey, New Mexico, North Carolina, Ohio,
Oregon, Pennsylvania, Rhode Island, South Carolina, South Dakota, Texas, Virginia, and West
Virginia. Among the anti-stacking minority, the court listed Arkansas, California, Illinois, Iowa,
New Hampshire, New York, Tennessee, Utah, and Washington.
106. See COUCH, supranote 8, § 45:628, at 77 n. 3 (citing cases from Connecticut, Florida,
Georgia, Hawaii, Illinois, Indiana, Kentucky, Louisiana, Massachusetts, Michigan, Minnesota,
Missouri, Montana, Nebraska, New Jersey, New Mexico, New York, North Carolina,
Oklahoma, Oregon, Rhode Island, South Carolina, South Dakota, Tennessee, Texas,
Washington, West Virginia, and Wyoming).
107. See Allstate Ins. Co. v. Hague, 449 U.S. 302, 307 (1981) (quoting Allstate Ins. Co. v.
Hague, 289 N.W.2d 43, 49 (Minn.1979)).
108. See Calvert v. Farmers Ins. Co., 697 P.2d 684, 687 (Ariz. 1985).
109. A dissenting justice in Dullenty v. Rocky Mountain Fire & Cas. Co., 721 P.2d 198
(Idaho 1986), said that Arizona and Ohio could be added to the list appearing in Calvert. See
Dullenty, 721 P.2d at 212 (1986) (Bristline, J., dissenting).
110. See WIDISS, supra note 9, § 40.4, at 248.
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states in support of that statement."' By 1998, it cited three more, for a total
of 23. " 2
As is apparent from the previous discussion herein, the Arkansas
Supreme Court did not immediately acknowledge the trend in favor of
stacking. In 1988, the court recognized that giving effect to anti-stacking
clauses was the "minority view," but contended that the minority view had
"gained acceptance (or remained the rule)" in other jurisdictions." 3 Four
years after that, in 1992, the court said the law in other jurisdictions was in a
"transitional stage" and that the jurisdictions in the minority had not
diminished." 4 By 1998, however, the court seemed to agree that Arkansas
was in a lonely minority, as it wrote that "[a]ccording to Widiss, thirty-six
states have rejected other insurance clauses on a variety of bases.""' 5 The
court nonetheless found "no grounds to depart from our precedent."'" 6 The
authors of this article seek to articulate those grounds.
V. WHAT ARKANSAS SHOULD DO

A.

Public Policy versus Ambiguity

Insureds seeking to overcome anti-stacking clauses often look for
ambiguity in those clauses because the well established rule is that ambiguous
clauses are invalid." 7 The Arkansas Supreme Court, like many others, has
found such ambiguity on occasion."' Victories for insureds based on
111. See WIDISS, supra note 9, § 40.4 at 248 n. 1 (citing cases from Arizona, Connecticut,
Florida, Georgia, Iowa, Louisiana, Maine, Massachusetts, Minnesota, Mississippi, Missouri,
New Hampshire, New Mexico, North Carolina, Ohio, Pennsylvania, South Carolina, Texas,
West Virginia, and Wisconsin).
112. See WIDISS, supra note 9, § 40.4, at 63-65 (citing cases from, among other states,
Illinois, Kentucky, and Oklahoma).
113. See Crawford,294 Ark. at 571, 745 S.W.2d at 134.
114. See Clampit, 309 Ark. at 114, 828 S.W.2d at 597. Clampit concerned underinsured
coverage, as opposed to uninsured coverage.
115. See Youngman, 334 Ark. at 79, 971 S.W.2d at 251.
116. See id. at 80, 971 S.W.2d at 251.
117. "Few doctrines are more well established in the law of contracts, as well as more
particularly in regard to the construction of insurance policies, than the proposition that
ambiguities in contract documents are resolved against the party responsible for the drafting."
WIDISS, supra note 9 § 13.6, at 582-83 (citing ROBERT E. KEETON & ALAN I. WIDISS,
INsURANCE LAW: A GUIDE TO FUNDAMENTAL PRINCIPLES, LEGAL DOCTRINES AND COMMERCIAL
PRACTICES § 6.3(a)(2) (1988)).

118. See Barnhill,284 Ark. at 221, 681 S.W.2d at 342-43 (holding that an anti-stacking
clause was "undoubtedly ambiguous" and thus invalid). See also Woolston, 306 F. Supp. at 742
("[Tihe Court is of the opinion that the 'other insurance clause' involved in this case is at best
ambiguous in a situation involving the issuance of two policies by the same company, and that
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ambiguous policy language, however, are always short-lived. Insurance
companies will be quick to rewrite policy language that has been declared to
be ambiguous (and thus invalid) in a published court opinion. That means
that, when a stacking case is decided in an insured's favor based on ambiguous policy language, that case will soon be rendered ineffective for future
insureds. To try to win the stacking debate on the behalf of insureds based on
arguments concerning ambiguous policy language is, therefore, to shoot at a
moving target. The answer is not in ambiguity; it is in public policy.
Illustrative of that is the Mississippi Supreme Court's decisively prostacking opinion handed down in 1997 in UnitedStates Fidelity & Guar.Co.
119
V. Ferguson.
Before Ferguson, Mississippi, like Arkansas now, allowed
insurance companies to contractually forbid stacking, so long as the policy
language was not ambiguous. 2 ° That led the Mississippi Supreme Court to
complain, in Ferguson,that insurance companies had responded by rewriting
their policy language and altering their premium schemes to "circumvent" its
decisions.' The court put an end to that in Fergusonby looking to its public
policy and announcing that it "mandates stacking."'2 In Mississippi, the rule
is now clear: an insured may stack uninsured coverage, regardless of antistacking clauses, ambiguous or not. Ferguson shows that a comprehensive
rule based on public policy can be more helpful to insureds than a string of
decisions based on ambiguous policy language.
B.

The Public Policy Argument

Even though the statutes of most states do not directly address stacking,
the majority of courts allow stacking, even in the face of anti-stacking clauses.
The basis for those pro-stacking decisions is usually public policy.' As one
it must be construed most strongly in favor of the plaintiffs.").
119. 698 So. 2d 77 (Miss. 1997).
120. See id. at 79.
121. See id.

122. See id. at 79 ("We now affirmatively declare that the public policy of this State
mandates stacking of [uninsured motorist] coverage for every vehicle covered under a policy,
regardless of the number or amount of the premiums(s) paid for [uninsured motorist]
coverage.").
123. Widiss writes:
Most of the appellate decisions are based on the judicial view of each state's public
policies, as represented by the enactment of the statutes which establish the
legislative requirements that apply to the uninsured motorist coverage. In these
opinions, courts typically conclude that insurance companies are precluded from
reducing the coverage so long as the claimant has not been fully indemnified. In the
view of these courts, legislative requirements were enacted in order to assure injured
claimants a source of indemnification and, therefore, a claimant should be allowed
to seek compensation from several covrages when a claimant has not been fully

1999]

STACKING

commentator says, "In the absence of a more direct statute addressing
stacking, it is usually necessary to analyze what public policy is embodied in
124
the general [uninsured or underinsured] statute."'
Arkansas does not have a statute directly addressing stacking, as Justice
Brown alluded to in Ross.125 Thus, it is necessary to analyze Arkansas'
uninsured and underinsured statutes, 126 as well as its entire statutory scheme
concerning the indemnification of persons injured in car wrecks, to discern
what public policy is embodied therein concerning stacking. That does not
mean that the public policy will be expressly stated in those statutes. The
general rule, also followed in Arkansas, is that a state's public policy is found
in its constitution and statutes. 127 That public policy must usually be discerned
2
by the courts, as has been the case in Arkansas in the past. 1
indemnified. Several judges have reasoned that so long as the uninsured motorist
insurance legislation does not expressly permit provisions that reduce the insurers'
liability in this situation, companies may not reduce or avoid liability through terms
in the coverage. There are also a few opinions which have concluded that even
though the uninsured motorist statutes do not include any express statements about
the Other Insurance [i.e., anti-stacking] clauses, the particular phrasing of the
statutory language of the general requirement precludes insurers from including
Other Insurance provisions that reduce a company's liability.
WIDISS, supra note 9, § 13.12, at 624.
124. See Russ, supra note 8, § 169:13, at 169-32. See also M.F.A. Mut. Ins. Co. v.
Bradshaw, 245 Ark. 95, 99-100, 431 S.W.2d 252, 254 (1968) (explaining that an insurance
company's contract with its insured is may be limited by "statute and public policy.") (citations
omitted).
125. See Ross, 320 Ark. at 611, 899 S.W.2d at 57 (Brown, J., concurring in part and
dissenting in part). In Ross, Justice Brown wrote that the underinsured statute was "silent on
the issue of stacking." That does not mean that a public policy in favor of stacking cannot be
discerned from the underinsured statute. Close on point in that regard, in a recent tort case,
Justice Brown wrote that a duty of care and the attendant standard of care could be "found in
a statute that is silent on civil liability." See infra note 128.
126. See ARK. CODE ANN. §§ 23-89-403 & 23-89-209 (Michie 1997).
127. See Sterling Drug, Inc. v. Oxford, 294 Ark. 239, 249, 743 S.W.2d 380, 385 (1988).
See also Drummond, supra note 20, at 168 ("[A]s a practical matter, all uninsured motorist
claims must be viewed in the context of an insuring agreement whose interpretation or validity
may be determined by the provisions of this statute or, more importantly, the public policy
which that statute is intended to implement." (emphasis added)).
128. One example of the Arkansas Supreme Court discerning public policy from a statute
where it was not expressly stated is found in Sterling Drug,Inc. v. Oxford, 294 Ark. 239, 743
S.W.2d 380 (1988). There, an employee sued his employer for wrongful discharge. The
employee claimed that the employer had forced his resignation upon belief that he had blown
the whistle on it by reporting it to the federal government for submitting false information
during contract negotiations. The court agreed that the employer had wrongfully discharged the
employee and that it had done so in violation of the public policy of Arkansas. To find that
public policy, the court looked to a criminal statute forbidding retaliation against witnesses,
informants, and jurors. See ARK. CODE ANN. § 5-53-112. The criminal statute had no literal
application to Oxford. Oxford was a civil case, not a criminal case, and the plaintiffwas neither
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To discern whether the public policy of Arkansas supports stacking
uninsured and underinsured coverage, one must look to the big picture. The
first thing to recognize in that picture is the backdrop of a "strong public
policy against exclusion of coverage."' 29 Or, as Widiss plainly writes,
"Indemnification is to be favored."' 30 That, after all, is the reason behind
Arkansas' legislative scheme designed to provide sources of indemnification
for persons injured in car wrecks. As previously discussed herein, that scheme
includes not only uninsured and underinsured statutes, but also a mandatory
liability insurance statute and a "no-fault" statute.'
Within that scheme, the Arkansas legislature attached special importance
to uninsured and underinsured coverage. The legislature considered those two
forms of coverage critical enough to mandate that insurance companies offer
them to insureds, who must take affirmative steps to reject them. 32 The
Arkansas Supreme Court took note of that in Shelter Ins. Co. v. Irvin.'
There, the court considered the original version of the underinsured statute,
which merely required insurance companies to "make available" underinsured
coverage to their insureds." 4 Pursuant to the statute, Shelter listed underinsured coverage among the optional coverages on its insurance application.'35
a witness, an informant, nor ajuror under the language of the statute. To find the public policy,
however, the court drew an inference. The statute, it inferred, illustrated a "public policy
favoring citizen informants or crime fighters." Oxford, 294 Ark. at 250, 743 S.W.2d at 386.
That public policy, it said, was "contravened if an employer discharges an employee for
reporting a violation of state or federal law." Id. Thus, the public policy at issue in Oxford was
not expressly stated in any statute, but was nonetheless "found in" one.
A more recent example arose in March of 1999, when the Arkansas Supreme Court
overturned its longstanding precedent and sided with the majority of states by recognizing
common-law liability for the negligence of vendors licensed by the state who sell alcoholic
beverages to intoxicated persons who, in turn, cause injury to third persons in Jackson v.
Cadillac Cowboy, No. 98-574, 1999 WL 144487 (Ark. 1999). There, the court drew an
inference from a part of the Arkansas Alcohol Beverage Control Act which prohibited the sale
of alcohol to a habitual drunkard or an intoxicated person. See ARK. CODE ANN. § 3-3-209.
Writing for the majority, Justice Robert Brown said "Although these ABC statutes do not
specifically provide for civil liability, a duty of care and the attendant standard of care may be
found in a statute that is silent on civil liability." Jackson, 1999 WL 144487, at *3 (citing
RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 286 cmt. d (1965)).
129. State Farm Mut. Auto. Ins. Co. v. Beavers, 321 Ark. 292, 297, 901 S.W.2d 13, 16
(1995) (citations omitted).
130. WIDISS, supra note 9, § 13.11, at 603.
131. See supra notes 14-17 and accompanying text.
132. See ARK. CODE ANN. §§ 23-89-403(b) & 23-89-209(a)(1).
133. 309 Ark. 331, 831 S.W.2d 135 (1992).
134. See 1987 Ark. Acts 335. The legislature later strengthened that requirement by
amending the underinsured statute to provide that insurance companies "shall provide
underinsured motorist coverage to the named insured unless rejected in writing by the insured."
1991 Ark. Acts 209.
135. See Shelter Mut. Ins. Co. v. Irvin, 309 Ark. 331, 333, 831 S.W.2d 135, 136 (1992).
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That was not good enough. The court said that, while other coverages
(collision, comprehensive, fire, theft, and windstorm) were not statutorily
mandated, "the General Assembly considered underinsured coverage
significant and vital enough to require by law that this new coverage be
offered to insureds."' 36 Because, in the court's eyes, Shelter had not done
enough to "make available" underinsured coverage to its insured, the court
implied that coverage to exist by operation of law, even though the insured
had not paid a premium for it. The court later commented in Ross, "[t]here is
no language in the underinsured statute requiring that result, but Irvin was
based on our recognition of publicpolicy,"'37 further support for the notion
that public policy may be discerned from the uninsured and underinsured
statutes.
The Arkansas legislature did not statutorily forbid the stacking of
uninsured and underinsured coverage, even though it did forbid the stacking
of another form of coverage. As previously discussed, 3 " Arkansas' "no-fault"
statute provides for, among other things, minimum medical benefits coverage
40
for insureds injured in car wrecks.' 39 In Travelers Insurance Co. v. Estes,
the insureds sought to stack medical benefits coverage. The Arkansas
Supreme Court rejected the insureds' argument, saying the flaw in it was its
"total disregard" of the portion of the no-fault statute which said that the
medical payments coverage "shall apply only to occupants of the insured
vehicle . . .and to none other."' 4' Because an insured will never be an
"occupant" of more than one insured vehicle in a single car wreck, an insured
will never be able to stack medical coverage under the no-fault statute. In
other words, the no-fault statute itself contains an anti-stacking clause. By
contrast, the uninsured and underinsured statutes do not contain anti-stacking
clauses. The inference to be drawn from that is that the legislature did not
intend for insureds to be forbidden from stacking uninsured and underinsured
coverage. That is especially true for underinsured coverage, as the
underinsured statute was enacted after the no-fault statute and even after
42
Estes.
There is already support from the Arkansas Supreme Court's decision in
Ross that the public policy of Arkansas favors stacking. As previously
136.
137.
138.
139.
140.
141.

Shelter, 309 Ark. at 335, 831 S.W.2d at 137 (emphasis added).
Ross, 320 Ark. at 608, 899 S.W.2d at 55 (emphasis added).
See supra note 15.
See ARK. CODEANN. § 23-89-202.
283 Ark. 61, 670 S.W.2d 451 (1984).
See id. at 64, 670 S.W.2d at 453.

142. The underinsured statute was enacted by Act No. 335 of 1987, three years after the
court decided Estes in 1984.
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discussed, 143 the Arkansas Supreme Court concluded in Ross that, based on the
language of Arkansas' underinsured statute, insureds may stack underinsured
coverage which is implied by operation of law. 44 As also previously
discussed, while the issue framed in Ross was limited to cases where
underinsured coverage was implied by operation of law, rather than by the
payment of premiums, there is no basis in logic or fairness to confine the
result in Ross to only those rare cases where the insured happened upon
underinsured coverage by operation of law. Arkansas' uninsured and
underinsured statutes promote indemnification for persons injured in car
wrecks by requiring insurance companies to provide uninsured and
underinsured coverage for every vehicle unless the insured affirmatively
rejects that coverage. 45 Insurance companies should not be permitted to
ostensibly provide what is required by statute (i.e., uninsured and underinsured coverage), to collect premiums for doing so, and then to take the coverage
away through anti-stacking clauses. Many courts have found that to run
against public policy.'46 Some have even found it "unconscionable."' 47
143. See supra notes 86-103 and accompanying text.
144. See Ross, 320 Ark. at 610, 899 S.W.2d at 56.
145. See ARK. CODE ANN. §§ 23-89-403 & 23-89-209(a)(1).
146. See Abramson v. Aetna Cas. & Sur. Co., 76 F.3d 304 n. 1 (9th Cir. 1996) (citing from
Walton v. State Farm Mut. Auto. Ins. Co., 518 P.2d 1399, 1402 (Haw. 1974), where the court
said "it was unconscionable to permit an insurer to collect a premium for the coverage and then
allow the insurer to avoid payment by use of anti-stacking language"); North River Ins. Co. v.
Tabor, 934 F.2d 461, 466 (3rd Cir. 1991) ("The other main reason cited by the Pennsylvania
courts in striking down anti-stacking provisions is protection of the reasonable expectations of
the insured. This reflects the concept that the insured, having paid multiple premiums, is
entitled reasonably to believe that he has multiple coverage."); Kent V. Middlesex Mut.
Assurance Co., 627 A.2d 1319 (Conn. 1993) ("[A]n insurer may not avoid liability for stacking,
even though language in the policy purports to do so, if the insured has paid a separate,
additional premium for underinsured motorist coverage. To permit an insurer to so limit its
liability under such circumstances would deprive the insured of a benefit for which the
policyholder has paid, a result not consistent with the reasonable expectations of the parties.");
Sturdy v. Allied Mut. Ins. Co., 457 P.2d 34,42 (Kan. 1969) ("When we pay a double premium
we expect double coverage ....
Defendant argues that what plaintiff is seeking amounts to
pyramiding coverage but nothing is said about pyramiding the premiums which effectuate the
coverages."); Allstate Ins. Co. v. Dicke, 862 S.W.2d 327, 329 (Ky. 1993) (anti-stacking
provision held void with regard to underinsured coverage: "when separate items of 'personal'
insurance are bought and paid for, there is a reasonable expectation that the coverage will be
provided."); Swartz v. Metropolitan Property & Cas. Co., 949 S.W.2d 72, 78 (Ky. Ct. App.
1997) (insured allowed to stack coverage for different vehicles insured under single policy
where insurance company, while ostensibly charging only one premium, in fact based premium
on whether policy covered single or multiple vehicles); United States Fidelity & Guar. Co. v.
Ferguson, 698 So. 2d 77, 79 (Miss. 1997) (even before categorically declaring anti-stacking
provisions void as against public policy in Ferguson, Mississippi courts "allowed the
aggregation of UM coverage despite anti-stacking clauses based upon ambiguity in the language
of the policy or the fact that separate premiums were charged for each car."); Jimenez v. Found.
Reserve Ins. Co., Inc., 757 P.2d 792, 794, 795 (N.M. 1988) ("Stacking is an appropriate means

1999]

STACKING

437

In further support of that notion, Couch says "the general rule is that
where the insured paid premiums on more than one policy of insurance, he
may recover from each carrier up to the total proceeds which the tortfeasor
was liable to pay.""'4 Widiss adds "A premium has been paid for each of the
coverages and the insurance policy has been issued. It seems both equitable
and desirable to permit recovery under more than one coverage until the
claimant is fully indemnified . . 149 Justice Stevens, of the United States
Supreme Court, once wrote "the [pro-stacking] rule is consistent with the
economics of a contractual relationship in which the policyholder paid three
separate premiums for insurance coverage for three automobiles, including a
separate premium for each uninsured motorist coverage."1 5o Justice Corbin,
of the Arkansas Supreme Court, has articulated similar notions in at least two
dissenting opinions. "' Justice Smith's words from the first Arkansas Supreme
to compensate for losses suffered by an insured through no fault of his or her own. [Citation
omitted.] By so holding, effect is given to the reasonable expectations of the insured who
purchased the multiple coverage."); Wilson v. Allstate Ins. Co., 912 P.2d 345 (Okla. 1996)
(insured could stack underinsured benefits under two policies pursuant to both public policy and
the insured's reasonable expectations where insurance company collected higher premium for
two cars which was almost double the premium charged for single-car coverage); Lake v.
Wright, 657 P.2d 643, 646 (Okla. 1982) ("[Ilt would be manifestly unjust to permit the insurer
to avoid its statutorily imposed liability by its assertion of'other insurance clauses' which would
deny the insured from receiving that for which he has paid a premium."); Cardoso v. Nationwide
Mut. Ins. Co., 659 A.2d 1097 (R.I. 1995) (insured could stack under Rhode Island's
underinsured statute only if he paid separate premiums); West Bend Mut. Ins. Co. v. Playman,
489 N.W.2d 915 (Wis. 1992) (court applied, in underinsured case, its earlier holding that,
"'[w]here an insured pays separate premiums, he or she receives separate and stackable
uninsured motorist protections whether the coverage is provided in one or more than one
policy."'); Schult v. Rural Mut. Ins. Co., 536 N.W.2d 135 (Wisc. Ct. App. 1995) (where insured
paid separate premiums he was entitled to stack coverage regardless of anti-stacking clauses).
See also Clampit, 309 Ark. at 116, 828 S.W.2d at 598 (Corbin, J., dissenting).
147. See, e.g., Walton v. State Farm Mut. Auto. Ins. Co., 518 P.2d 1399,1402 (Haw. 1974)
("it was unconscionable to permit an insurer to collect a premium for the coverage and then
allow the insurer to avoid payment by use of anti-stacking language"); Simpson, 318 F. Supp.
at 1156 ("it would be unconscionable to permit insurers to collect a premium for coverage
which they are required by statute to provide, and then to avoid payment of a loss because of
language of limitation devised by themselves."). See also WIDISS, supra note 9, § 13.6, at 582
(citing Simpson and saying, "In decisions invalidating Other Insurance clauses, several courts
have commented that 'it would be unconscionable to permit insurers to collect a premium for
coverage which they are required by statute to provide, and then to avoid payment of a loss
because of language of limitation devised by themselves."').
148. COUCH, supra note 8, § 45:628, at 72.
149. WiDiss, supra note 9, § 13.6, at 583.
150. Allstate Ins. Co. v. Hague, 449 U.S. 302, 328 (1981) (Stevens, J., concurring) (also
quoted in Clampit, 309 Ark. at 116, 828 S.W.2d at 598 (Corbin, J., dissenting)).
151. See Youngman, 334 Ark. at 82,971 S.W.2d at 252 (Corbin, J., dissenting) ("the added
premium is consistently being paid, but the coverage is less than consistently being provided.").
See also Clampit, 309 Ark. at 116, 828 S.W.2d at 598 (Corbin, J., dissenting) ("the Clampits
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Court case on stacking, discussed above, are also in accord. It is reasonable
to think, he said, that an additional premium charged for an additional
coverage on an additional
car is intended to afford "some corresponding added
1 52
insured."
the
to
benefit
C.

The Special Case for Stacking Underinsured Coverage

For the reasons expressed throughout this article, the authors believe that
insureds should be allowed to stack both uninsured and underinsured
coverage. There is, however, an additional justification for stacking
underinsured coverage.
The, Arkansas Supreme Court has recognized that the uninsured and
underinsured statutes serve different purposes. The court considered the
purpose of uninsured coverage for the first time over 30 years ago in Wallace,
where it said the uninsured statute was designed to provide the insured with
the protection that "would have been available had the insured been injured
by an operator with a policy containing the minimum statutory limits required
by the Motor Vehicle Safety Responsibility Act."' 15 3 The court again
considered the matter last year, in Youngman, where it said essentially the
same thing: "Recall that the purpose of section 23-89-403 [the uninsured
statute] is to put the injured party in as good a position as it would have been
in had the uninsured motorist been minimally insured as required by the
statute. ' ' " Federal decisions arising out of Arkansas have been in accord. 5 5
paid an additional premium to obtain additional underinsured motorist coverage. This
additional paid consideration eliminates any supposed prejudice to State Farm under the 'free
ride' theory advanced by the Dullenty opinion and relied upon by the majority of this court.")
(emphasis in original).
152. Epperson, 234 Ark. at 1102, 356 S.W.2d at 614 (regarding the stacking of medical
expense coverage).
153. Wallace, 245 Ark. at 232,431 S.W.2d at 744 (emphasis added); see alsoBarnhill,284
Ark. at 222,681 S.W.2d at 343 ("Certainly the spirit of the uninsured motorist protection statute
... is to provide minimum protection at a reasonable cost to the residents of Arkansas.") (Purtle,
J. dissenting) (emphasis added). "Motor Vehicle Safety Responsibility Act" refers to Act No.
347 of 1953, which established the minimum amounts for liability insurance coverage, as
currently set forth in Ark. Code Ann. § 27-19-605.
154. Youngman, 334 Ark. at 79, 971 S.W.2d at 251 (emphasis added).
155. In Childers,282 F. Supp. at 868, Judge Henley said "Clearly the basic purpose of [the
uninsured statute] was to enable Arkansas motorists purchasing automobile insurance to obtain
for an additional premium protection against death or injuries at the hands of a uninsured
motorist as they would have had if that motorist had obtained for himself the minimum coverage
required by the Safety Responsibility Act." Judge Miller quoted that passage with approval in
Howardv. Grain DealersMut. Ins. Co., 342 F. Supp. 1125, 1130 (W.D. Ark. 1972), where he
added "This is the principal theory and basic rationale for the mandatory offering of uninsured
motorist coverage in Arkansas." (citing Vaught v. State Farm Fire & Casualty Co., 413 F.2d
539 (8th Cir. 1969); Alexander v. Pilot Fire & Casualty Insurance Co., 331 F. Supp. 561 (E.D.
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Under that reasoning, it might be argued that, because the uninsured statute
was intended to provide insureds with the floor of coverage that each motorist
was required by law to carry ($25,000 today),' 56 but nothing more, there is no
need to stack uninsured coverage. The benefits from one uninsured coverage,
after all, should always provide at least the $25,000 floor required by law.
That reasoning will not hold in the case of underinsured coverage.
Underinsured coverage is not triggered until the tortfeasor's insurance
company has paid its liability limits, which, by statute, will always be at least
$25,000. I's Before the injured party receives his first dollar of underinsured
benefits, therefore, he will normally have already collected at least $25,000
from the tortfeasor's liability insurance company. Thus, underinsured
coverage is designed to provide an injured party with something more than the
$25,000 floor of required coverage. It is designed to afford the injured party
withfull compensation for his injuries.'5 8 Often times, full compensation can
only be achieved by stacking underinsured coverage. Other courts and
commentators agree on this. 9
In Clampit, the Arkansas Supreme Court said it "concede[d] the
distinction" between uninsured and underinsured coverage."6
While
uninsured coverage was designed to provide the "minimum recovery" required
by law, the court said, underinsured coverage was designed to provide

Ark. 1971)).
156. See ARK CODE ANN. § 27-19-605(a).
157. See ARK. CODE ANN. § 27-22-104 (Michie Supp. 1997).
158. See also Robert Burk, Shelter Mutual InsuranceCo. v. Irvin-The Arkansas Supreme
Court's RetroactiveApplication of the Amended Underinsured Motorist Act, 46 ARK. L. REv.
737, 739 (1993) ("The policy reasons behind legislation requiring underinsured motorist
coverage to be made available to the insured are arguably different than those behind uninsured
motorist coverage, since this coverage provides recovery beyond the minimum safety net
inherent in the uninsured policy.")
159. For a thoroughly articulated statement in support of this position, see the quoted
passage from the Iowa Supreme Court in Veach at supra note 85. See also Hernandez v.
Farmers Insurance Co., 460 N.W.2d 842, 844 (Iowa 1990) ("The purpose of underinsured
motorist coverage is aimed atfid/ compensation of the victim... [and] we see no duplication
of benefits until the victim has been fully compensated." (as quoted in WIDISS, supra note 9, §
40.4, at 255 n.2 (emphasis added)); North River Ins. Co. v. Tabor, 934 F.2d 461, 466 (3rd Cir.
1991) ("Throughout the several programs adopted by Pennsylvania for automobile insurance,
its courts have consistently seen a legislative intent to provide for thefullest coverage possible
for injured insureds, not in excess of their damages, -and this intent has extended into the
current MVFRL era. [Citations omitted.] Accordingly, in repeatedly striking down the antistacking provisions, one reason cited by the Pennsylvania cases has been the insurer's improper
attempt to cut back the coverage of insureds in violation of the statute's intent." (as quoted in
WIDISS, supra note 9, § 40.4, at 255 n.2 (emphasis added)).
160. See Clampit, 309 Ark. at 109, 828 S.W.2d at 595.

UALR LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 21

compensation "to the extent of the injury, subject to the policy limit."'' This
distinction is not only apparent from the widely recognized purposes of
uninsured and underinsured statutes, it has some additional basis in the
language of the two statutes. The underinsured statute, unlike the uninsured
statute, says that coverage shall enable the insured to recover the "amount of
damages" which he is "legally entitled to recover" from an underinsured
tortfeasor.'62 That connotes full compensation, not minimal compensation.
By contrast, the uninsured statute merely says that coverage is to be provided
who are legally entitled to recover damages
"for the protection" of insureds
63
from uninsured tortfeasors1
VI. CONCLUSION

Arkansas should overturn its longstanding anti-stacking precedent and
join the majority of states by allowing insureds to stack uninsured and
underinsured coverage, if their injuries so warrant, regardless of the antistacking clauses always found in their insurance policies. Beginning in 1968,
when the Arkansas Supreme Court first held an anti-stacking clause to be
valid in Wallace, the case law used to support that rule has been fragile. It has
only grown more fragile with time. Many of the cases cited by the Arkansas
Supreme Court in support of the anti-stacking rule have been overturned.
Others have lost their vitality for other reasons. Some had no vitality in the
first place. In Ross, decided four years ago, the Arkansas Supreme Court laid
the foundation for invalidating anti-stacking clauses based on the public policy
found in the uninsured and underinsured statutes. In Holcomb and again in
Youngman, decided just last year, the court came within a vote of invalidating
anti-stacking clauses. The present, newly constituted court may finally do so.
161. Id. at 109-10, 828 S.W.2d at 595 (emphasis added); see also State Farm Mut. Auto.
Ins. Co. v. Beavers, 321 Ark. 292, 296, 901 S.W.2d 13, 16 (1995) (quoting from Clampit).
162. The entire operative passage reads "The coverage shall enable the insured or the
insured's legal representative to recover the amount of damages for bodily injuries to or death
of an insured which the insured is legally entitled to recover from the owner or operator of
another motor vehicle whenever the liability insurance limits of such other owner or operator
are less than the amount of the damages incurred by the insured." ARK. CODE ANN. § 23-89209(a)(3).
163. The entire relevant passage reads "No automobile liability insurance covering liability
arising out of the ownership, maintenance, or use of any motor vehicle shall be delivered or
issued for delivery in this state with respect to any motor vehicle registered or principally
garaged in this state unless coverage is provided therein or supplemental thereto and is not less
than limits described in § 27-19-605, underprovisions filed with and approved by the Insurance
Commissioner, for the protection of persons insured thereunder who are legally entitled to
recover damages from owners or operators ofuninsured motor vehicles because ofbodily injury,
sickness, or disease, including death, resulting therefrom." ARK. CODEANN. § 23-89-403(a)(1).
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Insurance companies simply should not be permitted to ostensibly afford the
coverage provided for by the uninsured and underinsured statutes, to collect
premiums for doing so, and then to take that coverage away through antistacking clauses-all while insureds go without full compensation for their
injuries.

